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HEARING COMMISSIONERS
RALPH F. FUCHS

I
SUBSTANCE OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS

THE CONCLUSIONS of the Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government and those of its Task Force
on Legal Services and Procedure with respect to hearing officers fall
into two categories: those relating to the employment, tenure, status,
compensation, and removal of hearing officers; and those relating to
the extent of the authority of these officers, or hearing commissioners
as they would be called if the recommendations were adopted. Recommendations in the former category are substantially the same in the
two reports.
Recommendation No. 52 of the Commission report' and Recommendation No. 66 of the Task Force report' both propose, among
other things, that hearing commissioners be appointed by an authority
other than the agencies whose proceedings they will hear, and that
their tenure, status, compensation, and removal be fixed by law. This
recommendation of the Commission has the unanimous approval of
the members, except Congressman Holifield who dissented from the
report as a whole without, however, objecting specifically to Recommendation No. 52 in his separate statement. 3 The other pertinent
recommendations of the Commission do not carry the same endorsement.
Commission Recommendation No. 52 provides further that the
hearing commissioners should be under the control and direction of the
Administrative Court of the United States which the Commission elsewhere proposes. The Task Force also recommends that such a court
be established.4 The explanatory texts of both reports, although not
the recommendations, propose that a chief hearing commissioner, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,
be attached to the court to perform personnel functions with relation
Ralph F. Fuchs is Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law and a
Member of the Missouri Bar.
1 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Report to the Congress on Legal Services and Procedure 93 (1955) (hereinafter cited as
Comm'n Rep.; formal recommendations hereinafter referred to by number only).
2 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task
Force Report on Legal Services and Procedure 257 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Task
Force Rep.; formal recommendations hereinafter referred to by number only).
3 Comm'n Rep. 97-112.
4 Comm'n Recommendation No. 51; Task Force Recommendation No. 63.
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to hearing commissioners. 5 Both reports also propose that there be a
presidentially appointed advisory committee of five members, representing the judiciary, the agencies, and the bar.' The Administrative
Code which the Task Force proposes as a means of implementing its
recommendations provides, however, that the advisory committee
should be appointed by the council of the administrative court, consisting of the chief judge and the presiding judge of each section of the
court.' The functions of this committee would be more than advisory,
since it would promulgate rules regarding the qualifications of hearing
commissioners and pass on appointments of commissioners proposed
by the chief hearing commissioner."
Both reports conclude that there is sufficient variety in the proceedings to be conducted by hearing commissioners to justify the
establishment of two grades of commissioner positions.' The Task
Force proposes that there be senior hearing commissioners who
should be paid salaries of $14,000 a year and have tenure during good
behavior, in addition to ordinary commissioners who would have salaries of $12,000 and serve for eight-year terms.' 0 The Commission report is not specific on these points. Removal of commissioners from
their positions during their terms, for cause, would under both reports
be by a proceeding initiated in the administrative court by the chief
hearing commissioner."
The Commission and Task Force reports both propose that incumbents of hearing-examiner positions under the Administrative
Procedure Act who have held these positions at least one year immediately preceding the effective date of the commissioner plan "should
be appointed hearing commissioners.' 2 The Task Force's proposed
Administrative Code provides that for two years from its effective date
no other candidates than previous incumbents shall be appointed to
commissioner positions unless all available incumbents who have
served for at least a year have received opportunity for appointment
according to the procedure prescribed for new appointments. 3 The
reports further propose that incumbents who have served less than one
year should be retained in temporary status for two years in order to
afford them opportunity to qualify for regular appointments.14
5 Comm'n Rep. 89-90; Task Force Rep. 259, 264.
6 Comm'n Rep. 90; Task Force Rep. 264.
7 Proposed Administrative Code § 501 (hereinafter cited as Code), Task Force
Rep. 422.
8 Comm'n Rep. 90; Task Force Rep. 264-6S.
9 Comn'n Rep. 91; Task Force Rep. 265.
10 Task Force Rep. 265.
11 Comm'n Rep. 91-92; Task Force Rep. 26S-66.
12 Conm'n Rep. 92; Task Force Rep. 266.
13 Code § 503(a), Task Force Rep. 382.
14 Task Force Rep. 266; Conm'n Rep. 92-93.
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Commission and Task Force Recommendations Nos. 52 and 66,
respectively, agree that the hearing commissioners should be "completely independent" of the agencies whose proceedings they conduct.
In part, this independence would be achieved by the assignment of
commissioners to their posts by the chief hearing commissioner, which
both reports recommend.15 The Commission report recommends that
hearing commissioners "should be allowed to develop continuity of
service in one agency with the resulting familiarity and competence
that the special experience should create." 1 6 The proposed code would
leave assignment and transfers to the discretion of the chief hearing
commissioner "as he may determine to be necessary for the most
efficient conduct of... hearings," and would prohibit agencies from
utilizing hearing commissioners for any other purpose than those
specified in the code. Assignment of commissioners to cases is not
expressly covered in the reports or code; but the chief hearing commissioner would be required to maintain a master calendar of agency
hearings, for which the agencies would be obliged to furnish needed
information,'1 8 and he could so manage his assignment of commissioners as to check practices of which he disapproved.
Hearing-commissioner independence would be further secured
and authority connected with hearings be conferred upon the commissioners by additional recommendations of the Task Force and provisions of the code. These do not have the sponsorship of the Commission; but similar, although far from identical, recommendations
have been made by three of the twelve members. The dissent of
Congressman Holifield covers these recommendations and Commissioner Brown has reserved the right to disagree with any of them if
they are presented in Congress, of which he is a member. Commissioner Farley voted to transmit this group of recommendations, along
with additional procedural recommendations to which they are closely
bound, subject to reservations which he did not specify. Six Commissioners, including the Chairman, "did not vote for" this group of
recommendations, but agreed that the Commission should present
them to Congress. 9 They have the actual sponsorship, therefore, of
Commissioners Ferguson, McClellan, and Storey.
The Task Force recommendations and the corresponding ones
15 Comm'n Rep. 91; Task Force Rep. 265.
16 Comm'n Rep. 92.
17 Code § 504, Task Force Rep. 383. The Task Force's explanation of this provision states that "it is anticipated that hearing commissioners will be assigned to
not be reassigned except for
agencies on a semi-permanent basis, and that they vill
unusual circumstances." Task Force Rep. 423.
18 Code § 508, Task Force Rep. 384.

19 See Comm'n Rep. 95-112 for the respective statements of the Commissioners.
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transmitted by the Commission in the foregoing fashion recommend
that "separation of functions" in agency proceedings, as presently provided in the Administrative Procedure Act for cases of adjudication
with certain exceptions,2 0 be rendered more rigorous. Separation of
functions as so intensified would apply in rule-making and all instances
of adjudication in which agency action is based on the record of a
hearing.2 ' The requirement that action be based on the record of a
hearing would be extended to all proceedings in which opportunity for
any type of hearing is secured by constitutional or statutory provisions,
instead of merely those in which a statute or the Constitution requires
opportunity for a record-type hearing, as the Administrative Procedure Act now provides.22- In short, all hearings obtained as of right
would become record-type hearings, attended by an intensified separation of functions. The Task Force, but not the recommendations
transmitted by the Commission, would also require that in all recordtype proceedings the presiding officer, who almost always would be a
hearing commissioner,23 must render an "initial decision" which would
become the agency's decision unless set aside upon agency review,and that upon review of an initial decision the power of the agency be
limited to that of a reviewing court, "except for questions of policy
committed to the determination of the agency by Congress." 2 3 Hence,
hearing-commissioner determinations of fact would become final unless
"clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record," as specified in the judicial-review provision of the proposed code.26
Both the Task Force and the recommendations transmitted by
the Commission recommend enlargement of the powers available to
hearing commissioners at hearings as compared to those conferred
on hearing examiners by the Administrative Procedure Act.2 T The
20 Administrative

Procedure Act § 5, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), S U.S.C. § I004(c)

(1952).

21 Comm'n Recommendations Nos. 33(c), 37; Task Force Recommendations Nos.
35, 41; Code § 204(c), Task Force Rep. 368. Such proceedings will be referred to hereinafter as "formal."
22 § 5, 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1952).
23 Code § 205(a), Task Force Rep. 369, retains the provisions of the Admini-

trative Procedure Act § 7(a), 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(a) (1952), with
respect to the officers who may preside at record-type hearings, except that authority
for the conduct of hearings by single officials, other than hearing commissioners or
agency members, pursuant to other legislation (e.g., immigration-service special-inquiry
officers) would be withdrawn. See also Comm'n Recommendation No. 41; Task Force
Recommendation No. 45.
24 Code § 206(b), Task Force Rep. 372.
25 Code § 206(c), Task Force Rep. 372.
26 Code § 207(f), Task Force Rep. 374. See also Task Force Recommendations
Nos. 48, 49.
27 § 7(b), 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(b)

(1952).
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proposed extensions of authority confer: (1) the power to issue subpoenas in all cases; (2) discovery powers; (3) power to require conferences of parties; (4) power to rule on all motions, including motions to dismiss; (5) disciplinary powers at hearings; and (6) authority to take other actions in accord, to the extent practicable, with trial
procedure in the United States district courts.28 Interlocutory appeals from hearing-commissioner actions and rulings would be restricted by the Task Force 29 and under the proposed code to such as
commissioners might find "necessary . . . to prevent substantial
prejudice to any party or to expedite the conduct of the proceeding."8 0
To such possible appeals the Commission recommendation would add
appeals that might be based on a showing to the agency that substantial prejudice would otherwise result.31

II
RELATION TO OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

The foregoing recommendations cannot be considered entirely
apart from others to which they are closely related. Personnel functions relating to hearing commissioners could be attached to an adninistrative court, for example, only if such a court were established
pursuant to other recommendations. The essential aspect of the proposal for linking the chief hearing commissioner and the advisory
committee to the court is, however, that their functions should be
carried on independently of the administrative agencies whose hearings are to be conducted, by an authority so composed and so located
as to emphasize the judicial aspect of the functions of hearing commissioners . 2 If an administrative court does not become available
to harbor the chief hearing commissioner and the advisory committee,
the same emphasis can be obtained otherwise-e.g., by attaching them
to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, with proceedings for the removal of commissioners perhaps lodged in the advisory committee. This judicial emphasis in the recommendations
as to hearing-commissioner personnel administration as elaborated in
specific provisions, rather than the link to the proposed court, will be
discussed in this article.
The recommendations of the Task Force and those transmitted
by the Commission, relating to the authority of hearing officers and
the manner in which they should function, are similarly linked to a
28 Comm'n Recommendation No. 41(b); Task Force Recommendation No. 46; Codo
§ 205(b), Task Force Rep. 370.
29 Task Force Rep. 199.
3o Code § 205(c), Task Force Rep. 370. Cf. Task Force Rep. 199.
31 Comm'n Recommendation No. 41(c).
32 Comm'n Rep. 88-90; Task Force Rep. 258-59.
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"policy consideration" stated by the Task Force that "the more
closely . . . administrative procedures can be made to conjorm to
judicial procedures, the greater the probability that justice will be attained in the administrative process." 33 They are also linked to procedural recommendations, not directly affecting hearing commissioners, which are designed to carry out this view. The recommendations relating specifically to the work of hearing commissioners will
be considered here as an integrated group of proposals implementing
the conception of the Task Force and of the concurring Commissioners
as to administrative proceedings and the proper role of hearing officers
in them.
III
AGENCY IN CHARGE OF HEARING-CODMISSIONER PERSONNEL
ADmINISTRATION

The creation of an office of chief hearing commissioner and an
"advisory" committee has much to commend it, apart from the more
doubtful questions of where the office should be located in the governmental structure and of what its precise functions should be. Previous studies and reports by members of the legal profession or in
which lawyers have played a leading role have agreed that personnel
functions as to hearing officers should be performed by an agency in
which lawyers play a larger part than they do in the Civil Service
Commission's administration of section 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act.34 The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure in 1941 suggested an agency not unlike the one now proposed to ascertain the qualifications of examiners and play a determining role in their selection.3 5 The President's Conference on Administrative Procedure, in which there was strong sentiment for a
similar proposal, has recently recommended that the Civil Service
Commission place its hearing-examiner program in charge of a committee of five, at least two of whom should be lawyers. 31 The creation
of an independent chief judge or chief hearing examiner to administer
the work of a corps of administrative "judges" or examiners has been
33 Task Force Rep. 138.
34 60 Stat. 244 (1946), as amended, S U.S.C. § 1010 (1952).
35 Final Report 47 (1941) (hereinafter cited as Rep. Atty Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc.).
36 Report 9, 58-59 (1955). H.R. 4558, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), would establish
a three-member board of lawyers within the Civil Service Commisson to administer
the hearing-examiner system. For fuller discussions of the problem see two reports
to the President's Conference entitled "Appointment and Status of Federal Hearing
Officers" (Sept. 3 and Sept. 8, 1994). See also Musolf, Federal Examiners and the Conflict of Law and Administration (1952); Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Problem-Syrnptom and Symbol, 40 Cornell L.Q. 281 (1955); Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Fiasco Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1950); Thomas, Selection
of Federal Hearing Examiners, 49 Yale L.J. 431 (1950).
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proposed of late in several bills. 7 The Commission and Task Force
reports follow these suggestions, but combine them with the proposal
for an administrative court.
There has been substantial agreement that, regardless of where
the administration of a hearing-officer corps is located, the day-to-day
functions should be performed by a single administrator, with whom
a professional committee should be associated. The Commission and
Task Force recommendations are on sound ground in entrusting operating functions to a chief hearing commissioner and giving basic
policy-making functions to the "advisory" committee. The continuous
attention of a full-time official and the judgment of a professional
group are both required by the nature of the work to be done. The
administrator should not be dependent on the committee for action in
current matters; but the judgment of the committee should govern as
to basic policy, both because it would reflect valuable experience and
viewpoints, and because advisory functions would hardly be sufficient
to induce the members of such a committee to devote adequate time
to their occasional duties in competition with other demands upon
them.
The advisory committee proposed in the recommendations would
have five members. Its chairman would be a judge of the administrative court, two members would represent federal administrative
agencies, and two would be members of the bar experienced in representing parties before administrative agencies-a balanced distribution, representative of the interests affected." It is suggested below
that an official of the Civil Service Commission should be included
on the committee and the committee membership correspondingly enlarged, even if the committee is attached to the court."0 With this
addition the composition of the committee seems sound within the
court framework. The objection sometimes stated, that bar members
who practice before agencies might be improperly motivated, is believed to be insubstantial. They would function not in relation to
particular proceedings but in an over-all professional capacity and
in a framework that would support objectivity.4 ° The composition
37 S. 1018, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. 29, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R.
9035, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
38 Comm'n Rep. 90; Task Force Rep. 264.
30 Infra pp. 1349-51.

40 Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Problem-Symptom and Symbol, 40 Cornell L.Q,
281, 316-21 (1955). Committee members probably should be disqualified from participating in the reappointment of hearing commissioners who have presided at hearings

in which the members have served as counsel for either the agency or a private party.
The members of the committee of consultants which the Civil Service Commission used

at one stage of its administration of § 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act disqualifled themselves when they felt they might be prejudiced or partial. See the commit-
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of the committee would still be sound, with a different chairman substituted for an administrative-court judge, if no such court were
established, provided hearing commissioners were to function largely
in the judicial manner proposed in the reports.
Whether hearing commissioners should function in the proposed
highly judicial manner, or whether administrative agencies should retain substantially their present powers in proceedings before them is
the key question raised by the Commission and Task Force reports.
Its merits are discussed later. 41 If agency powers are not to be curtailed to such a degree, the committee which participates in administering the hearing-commissioner or hearing-examiner system should be
so composed as to give predominance to members who understand the
agencies' operating problems; for otherwise conflict of authority and
failure to meet legitimate agency requirements might result. A committee composed of a Department of Justice or Executive Office official
as chairman, two members from administrative agencies, two practicing lawyers, a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, and a member from the Civil Service Commission, would be preferable if the link to an administrative court is not
forged, and if enhancement of hearing-officer independence in agency
proceedings is not carried to the length proposed in the reports.
The desirability of having a member from the Civil Service
Commission on the advisory committee results partly from considerations relating to retirement, annual and sick leave, and possibly other
aspects of personnel administration with which the Commission has
had experience. Some, at least, of these incidents to government employment would be applicable to hearing commissioners,4 2 and would
require determinations to be made by the officials in charge of hearingcommissioner personnel. Time would be saved and mistakes avoided if
experience under the statutes administered by the Civil Service Commission were drawn upon by including a member from that agency.
Additional reasons for including such a member are discussed below. 3
tee's First Report 14 (1949). That committee was, however, so weighted with practitioners and judges prominent in the American Bar Association, who had becomne associ.
ated with criticism of previous hearing-officer performance, as to generate subsequent
distrust of its work. Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Fiasco under the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 747-49 (1950) ; Thomas, supra note 36, at 459-60.
41 Infra pp. 1356-72, 1373-74.
42 46 Stat. 470 (1930), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 693 (1952) (retirement); 6S Stat.
679 (1951), 5 U.S.C. § 2061 (1952) (leaves of absence).
43 Infra pp. 1350-51.
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IV
CHARACTER OF HEARING-COMMISSIONER PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

It is doubtful, to say the least, whether an informal personnel
system, operating according to the discretion of a few officers, such
as the Commission and Task Force reports propose, would function
as well, in relation to hearing commissioners, as a scheme that made
greater use of established merit-system methods of selection and appointment. There will inevitably be political, agency, and group pressures upon such an administration, to be resisted or constructively
channeled. Opportunity to be considered for appointment should be
accorded throughout the country, and appropriate techniques of grading applicants developed. Despite the attempt to render the hearingcommissioner positions judicial, they would be within a supervised
corps, and at least those commissioners serving for eight-year terms
would be considerably less independent than federal judges. For these
and other reasons 44 the positions would not be likely on the whole to
attract persons of the experience and attainments common among appointees to the federal bench, and an effort to recruit qualified applicants might need to be made.
The foregoing aspects of personnel administration for hearing
commissioners pose problems of a civil-service, as well as of a professional-legal, nature. It is true that relatively few positions are involved, 45 and that the problems are of a specialized nature; but these
are scarcely adequate reasons for casting loose altogether from previous experience. Yet the reports leave these matters at large, to be
handled in the discretion of the chief hearing commissioner and the
advisory committee. Their resourcefulness, objectivity, and fortitude,
coupled with whatever use they might choose to make of previous
experience so far as it was available to them, would constitute the sole
assurance that sound methods would be followed. Not more than
three members of the advisory committee would be members of the
same political party;4 6 but the real safeguard against abuse would lie
in a sense of professional responsibility. The scheme could be easily
44 Such reasons, applicable to bearing examiners under the Administrative Proce-

dure Act, include the specialized nature of most hearing-officer work, its relative remoteness from public attention, and the subordinate role of hearing officers in relation
to the agencies they serve. Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Problem-Symptom and Symbol,
40 Cornell L.Q. 281, 306-07 (1955). The proposals of the Hoover Commission and Task
Force would mitigate the first two of these elements and largely eliminate the third, as
respects hearing commissioners. It is believed that the differences between these officers
and judges would remain substantial, however.
45 Approximately 300 at the present time, involving only a small number of new
appointments for replacement each year. The use of eight-year terms would increase
this number.
46 Code § 501, Task Force Rep. 382.
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perverted and should be strengthened by, at a minimum, statutory provision for suitable merit-system methods as well as for a member of
the advisory committee from the Civil Service Commission. If these
provisions were added, the recommendations would be on sound ground
in providing for administration outside of the Civil Service Commission;4 7 without them more might be lost than gained by the adoption
of the proposals now made. The risk that the merit system might be
scuttled, without these safeguards, in favor of either partisan or
ideological politics is too great to run.
V
-iEARING-COMMSSIONERSTATUS

By entrusting hearing-commissioner personnel functions entirely
to the proposed chief hearing commissioner and advisory committee,
the Commission and Task Force reports would eliminate the possibility that these functions might be a means of agency dominance over
hearing officers. Agency determination of whether to fill a vacancy in
a hearing-officer position by new appointment, promotion, or transfer
from another agency; opportunity for an agency to favor a nonhearingofficer employee for appointment from among candidates who have
qualified; the promotion problem which was litigated in the Ramspeck
case; 4 and possible agency manipulation of reductions-in-force: all
these would disappear.49 Instead, hearing commissioners appointed as
specified in the proposed code would be assigned by the chief hearing
commissioner to the agencies, and would be reassigned by him or have
their service terminated as prescribed. Agency wishes would not
necessarily be eliminated from consideration in the assignment of
hearing commissioners, since there would be nothing to prevent the
chief hearing commissioner from taking these wishes into account.
If the Commission's and Task Force's theory of making the hearing commissioners more fully judicial is not accepted, the proposal to
have hearing officers appointed and assigned by an authority other
than the agencies becomes more questionable than it is in the context
of the reports. Although there is much to be said for this aspect of the
plan even under the present allocation of authority to hearing officers
and agencies, a safeguarded scheme of agency selection from limited
registers of eligibles would on the whole be preferable if the agencies
retained ultimate responsibility for their hearings and for the resulting
47 The reasons for a merit-system administration outside of the Commission are
stated in Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Problem-Symptom and Symbol, 40 Cornell L.Q.
281, 316-17 (1955).
48 Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
49 For a discussion of these problems see Fuchs, The Hearing Officer ProblemSymptom and Symbol, 40 Cornell L.Q. 281, 299-303, 304-12 (19SS).
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fact determinations. The hearing commissioners, or examiners as they
would still be called, would then remain officers of the several agencies,
subject to a method of selection, protection from possible agency pressures, and promotion of esprit de corps among them, that might contribute much to the quality of agency proceedings."
The proposals of the reports with regard to the salaries and
tenure of hearing commissioners are good. The salaries suggested
would place the compensation of hearing commissioners somewhat below that of agency heads and district court judges and on a par with
that of major bureau chiefs. Subsequent legislative adjustments presumably would preserve these relationships. The eight-year term for
ordinary commissioners would confer sufficient tenure to be attractive,
would ordinarily leave time in the life span of a commissioner who was
not reappointed to move into other fields, and would withhold permanent tenure from commissioners until their work had been thoroughly
tested. A commissioner who accepted a senior appointment at the
expiration of an eight-year term would have decided on the basis of
adequate experience that he wished to devote the remainder of his
professional life to a type of work which he presumably would regard
as challenging and rewarding even though the economic status that
accompanied it would be static. There is some question whether hearing officers of the contemplated stature really are needed for some
administrative hearings; but it probably is desirable to be generous
in this regard so as to avoid the difficulty connected with promotions
among more numerous ranks, which has proved to be a baffling one.
VI
ASSIGNMENT OF COMMISSIONERS TO PROCEEDINGS
In addition to entrusting assignment of hearing commissioners
among agencies to the chief hearing commissioner, the Commission
and Task Force reports and the proposed code provide that the latter
official should maintain a master calendar of agency hearings, open
for public inspection. 1 It may be doubted that much use would be
made of it by parties or counsel, who would continue to receive notice
of hearings from the agencies; but information furnished by the
agencies for use in maintaining the calendar would be administratively
useful to the chief hearing commissioner, and might aid him in detecting possible improper agency influence through the assignment of hearing officers to cases. Evidence of actual abuse by agencies in this
regard is lacking; 5 2 but it would be a boon to have this ghost laid.
50 Id. at 314-16.
51 Comm'n Rep. 92; Task Force Rep. 266; Code § S08, Task Force Rep. 384.

52 Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Problem-Symptom and Symbol, 40 Cornell L.Q.
281, 303 (1955).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

November 1955]

HEARING COMMISSIONERS

VII
RETENTION OF INCUmbENT HEARING EXAMaNES

The provisions of the proposed Administrative Code, with regard
to appointment of incumbents of hearing-examiner positions to hearingcommissioner posts if the code should be enacted, are in need of clarification. The proposed code would not secure unqualified "grandfather" rights to incumbents since it provides merely that "initial
appointments of hearing commissioners shall be made exclusively,"
until two years from the effective date of the code, "from persons who
for a period of at least one year immehave served as examiners
diately preceding" that date, unless within that time ' tall such examiners have been given the opportunity of appointment as hearing commissioners."5 3 Temporary appointment of examiners as commissioners
until the commissionerships have been filled would be authorized."
"Opportunity of appointment" may mean opportunity to accept
an offer of appointment, or it may mean merely opportunity to be considered. The words of the Commission and Task Force reports, that
examiners who have held their positions for at least one year "should
be appointed hearing commissioners," are likewise inconclusive.", The
Task Force report, after noting that "undoubtedly, there are some"
present examiners "who are not fully qualified to be appointed hearing commissioners or senior hearing commissioners,150' goes on to
state that present incumbents have been retained by their agencies
without challenge for fitness, and that "it would not be in the best
interest of the executive branch to produce a large turnover in hearingexaminer personnel. Those who prove incompetent could be removed
by complaint to the Chief Hearing Commissioner, and a proceeding
for removal predicated thereon." 7 Reliance on the removal power
to eliminate unqualified commissioners seems to indicate unconditional grandfather rights in the first instance; but mention of a "large"
turnover as undesirable may indicate that a lesser turnover might be
acceptable. Limitation of "opportunity of appointment" to a twoyear period, moreover, would create the possibility that some examiners might be left out by expiration of the time allowed. Drastic reduction in the number of positions available would result from the
53 Code § 503(a), Task Force Rep. 382. The Task Force's explanation (p.422)
of this provision states that it secures "opportunity of appointment" to "all present examiners"; but the intention to exclude those who would not have served at least one year
on the effective date of the code seems clear from the code provision and other pertinent
portions of the reports.
54 Code § 503(b), Task Force Rep. 382.
55 Task Force Rep. 266; Comm'n Rep. 92.
56 Task Force Rep. 266.
57 Ibid.
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transfer of National Labor Relations Board adjudicatory functions
to the proposed administrative court, as recommended by all but two
of the members of the Task Force. 8 A lesser reduction would follow
from the establishment of a trade section of the court, as the Task
Force recommends unanimously2 9
Logically and from the standpoint of the public interest in wellconducted proceedings, there should be no claim by incumbent hearing officers to an unqualified right of appointment to new positions
carrying duties and coinpensation which place them in a higher range
than previous positions involving similar functions;600 nor could legislation which adopted a genuinely altered scheme calling for different
qualifications of personnel rightly be regarded as "ripper" legislation
designed to oust incumbents. Psychologically, nevertheless, a claim
on the part of incumbents to perform work functionally similar to
what they did before would be strong, and it is doubtful whether even
the best possible administration of a change-over that involved a
screening of incumbents could avoid repercussions that would be extremely harmful." Under the circumstances, the Task Force's suggested reliance on the removal power as a means of eliminating wholly
unsatisfactory commissioners after they had received an opportunity
to qualify on the job probably constitutes the best available means of
early strengthening of the hearing-commissioner corps as compared
to the present staffs of examiners. Hence, the proposed code should
provide clearly for unqualified grandfather rights for incumbents who
have served at least a year.
VIII
AUTHORITY OF HEARING COMMISSIONERS IN CONDUCTING
HEARINGS

The enlarged authority of hearing commissioners in the conduct
of hearings, as proposed in the reports, compared to the authority
conferred by the Administrative Procedure Act, seems desirable in
58 Id. at 439-40.
59 Ibid.; Task Force Recommendation No. 63.
60 The name "hearing commissioner," which would replace "examiner" under
the proposed code, is deemed by the Commission (Comm'n Rep. 89) and the Task Force
(Task Force Rep. 267) to reflect, "more accurately than others, the quasi-judicial
status which these officers should have" and which the code would bestow more fully
than at present.
61 Mishandling of the previous attempt after the Administrative Procedure Act
became effective, rather than inherent factors, produced failure at that time; but thi
feelings then aroused are a continuing fact that would make another attempt more
difficult. An influential group of examiners, in particular, is effectively organized,
See Thomas, supra note 36, and Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Fiasco Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1950), for over-all accounts of the
previous attempt.
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the main. No good reason appears why subpoena powers should not
be available uniformly at hearings, instead of being limited by the
agencies' previous powers as under the Administrative Procedure Act
at present.6 2 It could be argued that, as proposed in an illustrative
rule laid before the President's Conference on Administrative Procedure and published by it, 63 subpoenas should be freely available to

all parties, subject to later objection by parties to whom subpoenas
are directed; but it seems preferable to enable agencies to control the
length of proceedings by requiring parties who seek subpoenas to
furnish "a statement or showing of general relevance and reasonable
scope of evidence sought," as the proposed code would do." Discovery powers constitute a more controversial subject;' but here
again it is difficult to understand why, if competently exercised by
qualified hearing officers who have discretion as to subpoenas, interrogatories, and other compulsory process, they would not contribute
to effective proceedings. The power to require prehearing and other
conferences instead of merely the authority to conduct them where
the parties consent seems similarly desirable and, if bestowed by
statute, should not give rise to serious dissatisfaction or resistance.
The view of the Commission with respect to interlocutory appeals,
which would enable the agencies to permit them if substantial prejudice would otherwise result, seems preferable to that of the Task
Force and to the provision of the proposed code, which would place
them wholly under the control of the hearing commissioners. Although
such appeals should clearly be restricted so far as feasible, it would
surely serve the interests of all parties to permit an agency to determine immediately some question, vitally affecting a proceeding, which
would be subject to its determination in the end. This would be especially true if hearing commissioners were authorized, as proposed, to
act on all motions. A motion to intervene, for example, may vitally
affect a proceeding, and its denial forecloses, at least for a time, full
participation as parties by persons wishing to have their day in court.
The benefit of the hearing commissioner's judgment should be had
without determining the matter irretrievably until a final decision has
been reached, if the agency sees fit to take it up for specific reasons.
62 § 7(b), 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 US.C. § 1006(b) (1952).

63 Report 16-18 (1955).
64 Code § 204(b), Task Force Rep. 368.
65 The Committee on Pleadings of the President's Conference on Administrative
Procedure considered the matter of discovery but did not report upon it. Three members of the committee made a statement, dated Sept. 30, 19S4, advocating that agencies
be urged to establish discovery procedures to the greatest extent their statutory powers
permit. The prindpal controversy over such a policy turns on whether discovery available to all parties would harmfully enhance the litigation aspect of adminitratve pro-

ceedings.
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A motion to dismiss which had been granted under a hearing commissioner's enlarged authority might be a subject of appeal to the
agency in any event; but if such a motion is overruled the question
presented may also be a legitimately important one which the agency
need not be denied all authority to take up immediately. It should be
sufficient if there is a clear statutory direction to hold interlocutpry
appeals to a minimum, especially as respects procedural matters. The
device of having the hearing commissioner find whether an interlocutory appeal is needed to avoid prejudice to a party or to expedite a
proceeding, as proposed in the code, should be primarily, but not
exclusively, employed. A motions commissioner to advise the agency
whether interlocutory appeals would be warranted, such as the President's Conference on Administrative Procedure has mentioned on the
basis of Federal Trade Commission practice, 0 might be a desirable
supplement.
Ix
RELATION OF HEARING COMMISSIONERS TO THE DECISIONAL PROCESS

The Proposed Distribution of Authority.-With relation to the
future of federal administrative methods, the most crucial questions
presented by, in particular, the Task Force proposals and, to a lesser
degree, those transmitted by the Hoover Commission are raised by
three recommendations: that the separation of functions as between
hearing commissioners and agency personnel be made more complete
than that which prevails under the Administrative Procedure Act, and
be extended to all formal rule-making and adjudication; that, except
where the parties expressly waive this procedural step, hearing commissioners render initial decisions in all such proceedings in which
they have presided; and that agency review of these decisions be
limited to the same scope as judicial review of agency decisions, "except for questions of policy delegated to the agency by Congress."0 1
66 Report 81-82 (1955).
07 Of these recommendations, only the extension of separation of functions to
additional proceedings has been presented by the Commission, in Recommendations
Nos. 33(c) and 37. This entire group of recommendations, which the Task Force Includes in its Recommendations Nos. 35, 41, 48, and 49 and proposed code §§ 204(c),
206(b), and 206(c), respond to much of the essence of that group's theory, already
quoted, that "the more closely . . . administrative procedures can be made to con.
form to judicial procedures, the greater the probability that justice will be attained
in the administrative process." Task Force Rep. 138. Their importance is correspondingly great. As to agency review of hearing-commissioner initial decisions In rulemaking, the Task Force report states at one point that "agencies should ... have all the
powers which they would have in making the initial decisions themselves," because
"the making of [rules] . . . involves policy considerations which justify independent
appraisal of pertinent facts and circumstances by the agency." Task Force Rep. 204.
Task Force Recommendation No. 49 and § 206(c) of the proposed code, however, both
provide that "in rule making required under the Constitution or by statute to be mado
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All the other recommendations which would enhance the status and
independence of hearing commissioners as compared to the present
hearing examiners and alter the manner in which proceedings would
be conducted still leave unimpaired the agencies' present authority
and means of advice to hearing officers in regard to matters of substance. These recommendations, on the other hand, would drastically
curtail agency power in the respects mentioned. They would make the
hearing commissioner truly a trial judge no more subject to agency
advice or authority than the courts in enforcing a regulatory statute
or agency regulations in penal actions or injunction suits at the instance of an agency, except that the rules of practice applicable to a
proceeding before a commissioner would stem from the agency, and
that interpretative regulations of the agency, adopted after opportunity for public participation as provided in another recommendation,"8 would be binding upon him.
To carry "judicialization" of formal administrative proceedings
to the length proposed, while at the same time retaining the over-all
responsibility of agencies under the statutes establishing them, seems
entirely unsound. It would be far better to transfer to an administrative court609 or to other trial tribunals 0 the full jurisdiction and responafter hearing," as well as in all formal adjudications, the scope of review by the agency
shall be the same as that of a court upon judicial review of agency decisions, "except
for questions of policy" committed to the agency by Congress. Doubtless the qualification with respect to questions of policy is intended to take care of the point which is
made in the text of the report. The report states elsewhere that "to as.sert that formal
rule making is, unlike adjudication, not an adversary proceeding is to have regard only
to the form of the proceeding and to ignore realities" (p. 164), and that "the person
best qualified, apart from special circumstances, to arrive at a correct decision in an
adversary matter is the person who actually hears and receives the evidence" (p.202).
Hence, the Task Force's intention to limit agency review of hearing-commissoner fact
determinations in formal rule-making as well as adjudication seems dear.
68 Comm'n Recommendation No. 33(a), (b); Task Force Recommendation No. 32.
See Task Force Rep. 159. The Commission's recommendation excepts "matters . . .
relating solely to internal agency instructions." Since hearing commissioners would not
be within the agencies, this exception would not apply to instructions to them. For the
smae reason and because private parties must observe them, rules of practice applicable
to hearings before commissioners would also have to be preceded by opportunity for
public participation. Even the obligation to follow agency precedents would be drastically curtailed by the provision of § 208(b) of the proposed code that no sanction, as
broadly defined, "shall be imposed against a person for pursuing a normal, customary,
or previously acceptable course of conduct, unless such conduct shall have been proscribed or restricted by a generally applicable rule of the agency." Task Force Rep. 417.
69 Comm'n Recommendation No. 50 and Task Force Recommendation No. 62 propose the transfer of certain deciding functions of administrative agencies to the United
States courts, and Comm'n Recommendation No. 51, together with Task Force Recommendations Nos. 63-64, propose the transfer of other functions to the proposed administrative court. The merits of these recommendations do not fall within the
province of this article.
70 The often-suggested separation of regulatory agencies into initiating and ad-
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sibility to decide contested administrative matters than to create the
hybrid proceeding which the Task Force proposes, involving power
without sufficient responsibility on the part of hearing commissioners
and responsibility without adequate power on the part of the agencies.
In addition, the means of deliberation and of obtaining information,
which are important and normal to agencies, would be curtailed as
respects hearing commissioners to a point where they would be even
less than those available to courts.
Under the recommendations the power to find facts would be
placed largely in the hands of the hearing commissioners, with judicial review available to any party who might claim that an agency
had exercised more than the limited check permitted to it under the
proposals; yet the agencies would continue to be charged with the
duty of effectuating the statutes they administer. Whenever a hearing
commissioner presided at a hearing, he alone would be empowered to
formulate the decision that must become the agency's if not susceptible
to change on the grounds specified in the proposed code. 1 These do
not include error in conclusions of fact unless the conclusions are
"clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record." In formulating his decision the hearing
commissioner would be insulated from all processes of consultation
with agency staff members as well as others. These changes from the
present distribution of authority will now be discussed.
Authority to Determine Facts.-The conception with regard to
fact determination, which causes the Task Force to recommend that
this function be vested in hearing commissioners subject to the same
scope of review by agencies as courts would exercise with respect to
agency findings except as questions of policy committed to agencies
may be involved, is nowhere stated explicitly. Apparently, however,
it is a conception which looks upon "facts" as all of the same variety,
subject to ascertainment with maximum accuracy in a contested proceeding by "the person who actually hears and receives the evidence"
and can, therefore, judge the weight to be given to the testimony of
witnesses "on the basis of their demeanor." 7 Ignored at this point
judicating agencies would establish a reasonably clear distribution of responsibility
between the former, which would be expected to effectuate the governing statutes by
seeking adjudications, and the latter, which would have the responsibility for rendering decisions to the same ends. The Labor Management Relations Act establishes such
a division of functions and of responsibility in somewhat less clear-cut form. The present
proposals would continue to combine in the agencies the initiation of proceedings with
some aspects of reaching decisions, but would assign final responsibility for other
aspects of decisions to hearing commissioners, without answerability of the hearing commissioners to any authority concerned with the effectuation of statutory policies.
71 Code § 207(f), Task Force Rep. 374.
72 Task Force Rep. 202-03.
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are the distinctions among different varieties of facts which cause
some of them to turn largely on oral testimony and others to reflect
recorded data entirely or in considerable part. It is not explained
why the hearing officer's conclusions should be preferred to the
agency's as to the latter type of facts.73 Also overlooked is the related
situation in which conclusions turn not on the demeanor or credibility
of the witnesses, but on the significance of the undisputed information
they offer. Here too the officer may be in no better position than the
agency to weigh the evidence.74
Insofar as policies committed to an agency by Congress may be
involved in fact determination, the Task Force recommendations permit an agency to substitute its conclusions for those of a hearing
officer. It is impossible to say, however, whether recognition would
be given to agency authority as to the questions of judgment or discretion, falling short of policy issues that are clearly identifiable as
such, which are bound up with numerous fact determinations that
agencies make. According to the Supreme Court in a leading case, for
example, the question whether the term "sausage" would be "false and
deceptive" when applied to a product containing more than a specified
percentage of cereal is "a question of fact, the determination of which
is committed to . . .the Secretary of Agriculture" by the Meat Inspection Act, "and the law is that the conclusion of the head of an
executive department on such a question will not be reviewed by the
courts, where it is fairly arrived at with substantial evidence to sup7
port it."1
The same thought was expressed in a more recent case
of a similar nature where the determination was made on the record
of a hearing, and would come under the Task Force's proposal as to
agency review. 7 In the second case especially, however, the question
at issue was recognized by the Court as also one of judgment or discretion rather than merely of fact; but it made little difference, since
the Court would defer to the agency in the absence of abuse however
the question might be characterized. Under the Task Force's formula
for agency review of the findings of hearing commissioners, the distinction between fact and policy would be crucial, since upon it
would turn the question whether the agency might freely substitute
73 Elsewhere the Task Force recommends that agencies and presiding officers should
have authority to provide "for the submission of all or part of the evidence in ,ritten
form, provided that no party is substantially prejudiced thereby." Code § 20S(d),
Task Force Rep. 190-91. Possibly the initial decision might be waived most readily
by the parties in a proceeding where the evidence was so submitted, thus enabling the

agency to make fact determinations for itself; but the agency would have only the
opportunity of one party among several to bring about such a result.
74 See Allentown Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 222 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
75 Houston v. St. Louis Independent Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479, 484 (1919).
76 Federal Security Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 227, 233 (1943).
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its judgment for that of the commissioner or would be bound by his
determination unless it were "clearly erroneous."
At the very least, endless litigation would spring up around the
issue in case after case, with no prospect that the results would give
satisfaction to anyone. The Task Force is itself proposing that the
results of previous litigation on an analogous issue surrounding the
scope of judicial review of agency determinations be changed. 7 That
issue relates to whether certain questions of statutory interpretatione.g., in a leading case, who is an "employee" subject to the statute7 8involve questions of fact, as to which a reviewing court is concluded
by agency determinations supported by substantial evidence, or
whether they are questions of law, as to which a court is free to substitute its judgment.7 9 The effect of this troublesome issue is confined
to the relatively small number of cases in which judicial review of
agency determinations is sought. The issue raised by the Task Force,
by contrast, would affect every formal proceeding in which a factpolicy question was involved, and would plague the agencies each
time they were required to review hearing-commissioner determinations in such cases. No one would know whether commissioner or
agency had the last word on, for example, questions of safety of transportation equipment, deceptiveness of competitive practices, relative
need of communities for broadcast services, relative fitness of competing license applicants, or a host of other questions on which decisions
in both rule-making and adjudication turn and which heretofore have
been at the core of agency responsibility.
Recent judicial utterances have called attention to the policy element in some fact determinations and its implications for procedure,
administrative judgment, and judicial review. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in an opinion by Judge
Prettyman, 80 for example, has recognized the "forward-looking function" of an agency in licensing carrier operations, which "in that
respect . . . differs markedly from a purely judicial or quasi-judicial
determination of present or past rights." Although the necessary determinations "cannot be fashioned from pure fantasy" and must be
based on "a hard core of factual possibility, which can be ascertained
77 Code § 207(g), Task Force Rep. 374; Task Force Rep. 216-17.
78 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
70 See the discussion of this question in Dickinson, The judicial Review Provisions

of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (Section 10) Background and Effect,
published in Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Administrative Agencies
546, 581-85 (Warren ed. 1947); and in Benjamin, Judicial Review of Administrative
Adjudication: Some Recent Decisions of the New York Court of Appeals, 48 Colum.
L. Rev. 1 (1948).
80 American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 192 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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and evaluated only upon the basis of present and past events and
conditions," the questions at issue involve "matters of foresight, not
products of unblended hindsight.1's l Hence, the agency has broad authority in accepting, discarding, and evaluating evidence as to traffic
needs and in coming to conclusions concerning these needs and the
amount of transportation to be supplied. To what extent, one asks,
would this authority remain with the agency, and to what extent would
it be transferred to the hearing commissioner and insulated from
agency review under the Task Force recommendations? 8 2
It is, of course, the intimate association of fact with policy crystallized iito law and with discretion, or policy, entrusted to agency
determination that accounts for the traditional impossibility of sharply
distinguishing facts from other elements for purposes of judicial review. 3 Yet the Task Force seeks to require a clear separation of
questions of fact so as to insulate them in part from agency review,
thereby breeding litigation and endangering the essence of the functions the agencies were established to perform.
The Task Force, it is fair to say, fails to recognize in its report as
a whole the central importance of agency competence to determine
facts. For example, the report states at one point that "the substantial evidence rule was developed by the courts for the review of administrative orders because such orders commonly were based upon
proceedings which did not conform to the evidentiary rules applicable
in the judicial process" and which, consequently, resulted in voluminous records that "could not always be examined by the reviewing
court with the same degree of care and thoroughness that the reviewing
court would normally apply to the record of the trial court." Hence,
it is said, the need for restrictive judicial review largely disappears
"when... the administrative process is brought into reasonable relation to the judicial process, and records are compiled by competent
presiding officers .. . ."S Aside from the doubtful assumption that
voluminous administrative records result mainly from loose practices
81 Id. at 420, 421.

82 Consider also such questions as whether one corporation is subject to the "controlling influence, directly or indirectly" of another which owns a minority block of
its stock, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. SEC, 127 F.2d 378 (gth Cir. 1942), and whether
market value is the proper measure of the recognition to be accorded in a "fair and
equitable" reorganization plan to a remote and speculative interest in a corporation,
Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v. Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336 (1951).
83 Cf. Prettyman, J., dissenting, in Selden v. Capitol Hill Southeast Citizens
Ass'n, 219 F.2d 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1954): "What I am saying [about a zoning adjustment
board's lack of legal authority for an order] might be cast in terms of support in the
evidence, arbitrary action, and abuse of discretion." See also Davis, Administrative Lav
876-77 (1951); Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the
United States 50-55, 150-55, 320-32 (1927).
84 Task Force Rep. 215.
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8
in the admission of evidence and incompetence of presiding officers,
this statement wholly ignores "the respect that courts have for the
judgments of specialized tribunals which have carefully considered the
problems and the evidence," which accounts much more largely for
the recognized limits to the scope of judicial review of agency action
than any other factor.8 0 The Task Force, it is true, states that "the
agency has technical knowledge in the field of its special competence,"
and "is concerned primarily with the wise exercise of administrative
discretion,, in accordance with statute. 8 7 It also asserts that formulation of the decision "in an adversary matter" by the "person who actually hears and receives the evidence," subject to limited agency review, "does not, of course, affect the determination of policy questions delegated by Congress to an agency"; 8 but competence to determine facts is not mentioned as important. The assertion is made,
indeed, that "the responsibility for decision . . . properly belongs in
the first instance" to "the officer whose special function it is to conduct the administrative hearing.""So
The only justification advanced for limiting the authority of agencies in fact determinations when hearing commissioners preside at
hearings, which goes beyond analogy to judicial proceedings and the
alleged desirability of having such determinations made by persons
who have heard and received the evidence, relates to the need for
overcoming the effects of a "combination of prosecutor and judge"
in an agency, 0° from which a detached hearing commissioner will be

85 The President's Conference on Administrative Procedure has concurred with a

report to the Judicial Conference, adopted by that body, which finds that the tendency
toward undue liberality by administrative hearing officers in the admission of evidence
"has been due principally to the attitude of the regulatory agencies themselves and of
the Federal courts, which have criticized hearing officers for excluding evidence of
doubtful relevancy in unwarrantedly sweeping terms." President's Conference on
Administrative Procedure, Report 53-54 (1955). The bulkiest records undoubtedly result
from the complexity of certain proceedings, which it requires special methods and skill
to keep to minimum size, and which have plagued the courts as well as administrative
agencies. See Committee on Practice and Procedure in the Trial of Antitrust Cases,
ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Report (1954); Dession, The Trial of Economic and
Technological Issues of Fact, 58 Yale L.J. 1019, 1242 (1949); McAllister, The Big Case:
Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 27 (1950).
86 Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc. 91. Cf. Dickinson, supra note 79, at 592-96;
Davis, Administrative Law 877-80 (1951). Where the court itself, by trial de novo, has
compiled the record upon which it acts, the scope of review may still be limited, as In
Houston v. St. Louis Independent Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479 (1919).
87 Task Force Rep. 205.
88 Id. at 202.
89 Id. at 203.
90 The Task Force report, at 176-77, emphasizes this factor in dealing with the

separation of functions, and includes the presiding officer's "independent judgment on
the evidence" as one of the objectives to be secured. The same reasoning lies behind
the proposed policy of preferring that judgment, when obtained, to the agency's in relation to fact determinations.
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free. There is indeed a problem here; but its importance varies in
different kinds of proceedings, and there are many in which it does
not arise.Y' Its solution, therefore, requires identification of the situations where it is present and the formulation of appropriate remedies
in those situations.92 Whether any such remedy can wisely separate
principal responsibility for fact determination from ultimate responsibility for decisions, 93 as the Task Force proposes, involves additional
considerations that require discussion.
The idea that fact determination is a mechanical process which,
if correctly employed by a neutral authority, leads always to a "right"
answer as distinguished from a "wrong" one is erroneous. Procedural
policy based upon this idea would be self-deceiving and might work
great harm. On the contrary, even where "facts" are pure facts--free
of the "forward-looking," policy aspect just discussed-they may turn
on complex data, like facts concerning the national income or other
economic phenomena, or on obscure evidence, like the circumstances
of an unwitnessed accidental death or the presence of a threat of an
epidemic of disease. In any such situation the "facts" established in
official proceedings must be inferences which the trier of fact draws
from the evidence. Conflicting inferences will be possible to the extent
that each is rationally supportable on the basis of evidence favorable
to it when cast against the opposing evidence. 4 After the trier of fact
91 The Task Force report selects a passage from the report of the "minority" of
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure which, standing alone,
seems to indicate that the problem arises whenever the "stages of making and applying
law have been telescoped into a single agency." Task Force Rep. 176. There is a combination of some kind in the functions exercised in such situations; but it is not a
combination of "prosecuting" and judging unless the agency has initiated the proceeding
with a view to securing a result adverse to a private party. When a private party seeks
an advantage, such as a license or a rate increase, which there may be governmental
reasons for withholding, the tables are turned, and the danger of agency "bias" is of a
different sort. If the agency acts as an umpire between private parties, as it may where
one of two or more license applicants for mutually exclusive privileges will have his application granted, the situation is still different. See Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, The
Judicial Function in Federal Administrative Agencies 209-10 (1942); Fuchs, The Hearing
Officer Problem-Symptom and Symbol, 40 Cornell L.Q. 281, 288 (1955).
92 As pointed out above, the establishment of a deciding agency separate from the
one that initiates proceedings is such a remedy. Conduct of the hearing by a hearing
officer separated to a large extent from the personnel that investigates problems coming
before the agency and initiates proceedings is another, which the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act instituted for the bulk of federal agencies, but with some differentiation
among types of proceedings. Id. at 291-92, 321-23.
93 This is what happens, of course, under a system of special verdicts by juries,
adopted to correct evils under the system of general verdicts. The judge, who may be
hampered in reaching just results by jury verdicts with which he disagrees, is without
other responsibility than to apply the law to the facts as found in the particular case.
94 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 US. 474 (1951), having established this
test as the one to be employed under the substantial-evidence language of § 10(e) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1952), it is
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has mustered all the objectivity and conscientiousness of which he is
capable, his inferences may still be the product of conscious or unconscious choice within rational limits.05 Enforcement of these limits
may be had through an external check, such as suitably restricted review of an agency's determinations by a court; but broader review
gives opportunity, not for measurably more correct answers than the
original ones, but for the substitution of different rationally sustainable
inferences for those originally drawnY0 It may become of the highest
importance who shall be the trier of fact whose inferences, if rationally sustainable, will stand; for in many cases any inferences drawn
will reflect in some degree the choices inevitably involved in reaching them, and these will in turn reflect, equally inevitably, the predilections of the trier of fact. Heretofore in administrative proceedings,
even when the officer who has presided at a hearing has drawn inferences in an initial decision or report, the agency has been empowered
to substitute its own conclusions. The Task Force now proposes to
withdraw this authority and to substitute the presiding officer, usually
a hearing commissioner, as the decisive fact determiner.
It is believed that the foregoing recommendation cannot be justified. The agency charged with effectuating the purposes of a statute
should have authority to find the facts within the limits imposed by
judicial review." Whether or not a combination of functions on the
believed that any other language defining the scope of review, such as "clearly erroneous
in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record" which
the Task Force now proposes, would either: (1) not work any significant change except
to breed abundant litigation over its meaning; or (2) impose an indefinable limitation
upon review, effectuated largely through guilt feelings or the second-guessing of reviewing
courts.
95 See Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York 329, 336-38
(1942); Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United
States 318-19 (1927).
96 Every reason exists, of course, why a reviewing agency with full power to substi-

tute its findings for those of a presiding officer should defer to his conclusions Insofar
as they reflect his judgment of the demeanor and credibility of witnesses whom he ob-

served. The Universal Camera decision imposes a duty to defer, although its extent is
difficult to measure. See the case on remand, 190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951). The agency

may wish to rely on its hearing officers' conclusions to an additional extent, because they
reflect knowledge built up during the hearings, or because it is satisfied with Initial

determinations not shown to exceed rational limits. Of course it should be free to do so;
but the choice as to such reliance should rest with it.
97 This conclusion is not inconsistent with complete separation of "prosecuting"
from deciding where it is determined that the separation should be made. The deciding

agency then becomes the responsible one in formal proceedings unless it is supposed to
proceed mechanically and with indifference to results. If it employs hearing officers,
the problem as between it and those officers is the same as with an agency exercising
"combined" functions. Cf. Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in the State of Now

York 338 (1942): Unless an administrative agency, operating where adjudication is only
one part of a larger process, "is permitted to act on the basis of its own adjudication,
when that adjudication is rationally supportable, the whole process of administration will
be unduly impeded."
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part of the agency heads exists, the predilections which operate in
fact determinations should be those to which the agency's interpretation of the statutory purposes leads and for which the agency will be
answerable to Congress, to higher executive authority, if any, and to
the public. 8 Any attempt to substitute a supposedly neutral officer
within the framework of continued agency responsibility can only
introduce other, more fortuitous and variant predilections for the
agency's, rendering the agency's position largely intolerable and unattractive to competent personnel. It is difficult to see who could
benefit from such a situation except, from time to time, a party to an
agency proceeding whose interest coincided with a particular hearing
commissioner's predilections.
Authority to Formulate Decisions.-The same factors as argue
for continued agency authority over fact determinations suggest, although with less force, that there should be continued authority to
substitute a recommended decision by the hearing officer for an initial
decision by him, 9 or to substitute a tentative agency decision or a
recommended decision by any of its responsible officers in rule-making
or initial-license proceedings.1 00 If the issues do not turn primarily
on oral testimony, agency competence for formulating conclusions, or
that of particular staff members who have not been investigators, advocates, or prosecutors in the same or a related proceeding, may exceed that of a hearing commissioner. However, the reasons for having
the presiding officer render an initial decision in most cases are
strong.' 01 These include not only the presiding officer's familiarity
with the case through having presided at the oral hearing, but also
the added dignity and efficiency which may attach to the hearing because of knowledge that the presiding officer will be in command of
the case until an initial decision has been rendered.
98 For example, the inference that a death during employment arose "out of and

in the course of" the employment, where rationally sustainable, may legitimately be
preferred to the contrary inference, or be chosen instinctively, so as not to defeat the
purpose of a workmen's compensation act to afford relief from the economic effects of
industrial accidents. The adverse consequences in such a case fall upon an insurance fund.
Where an inference relates to conduct having an ethical aspect or leads to serious disadvantage to specific persons, such as the inference that an employer has discharged
certain workers for union affiliation rather than for unsatisfactory performance on the
job and must therefore reinstate them with back pay, the reasons for seeking determinations uninfluenced by "prosecution" become strong; but they should still be those of
officials who bear the over-all responsibility for sound decisions.

99 As these terms are used, an initial decision is one that takes effect as an agency
decision unless reviewed, whereas a recommended decision requires agency approval
before becoming effective.
300 Administrative Procedure Act § 8(a), 60 Stat. 242 (1946), S US.C. § 1007(a)

(1952).

101 Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc. 45-51.
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The latitude which the Administrative Procedure Act 1°2 permits
resulted from the strongly expressed views of agency representatives
while the act was pending that there was a need in relation to rulemaking and certain other "forward-looking" agency functions for
bringing the resources of agency staffs to bear in the formulation of
tentative or recommended decisions. 10 3 In practice under the act
regulatory agencies which conduct these types of proceedings have
tended to make use of the latitude permitted by not authorizing their
hearing examiners to render initial decisions.0 4
The Task Force's recommendation that if the agency has not presided at the reception of the evidence, the presiding officer prepare
and file an initial decision in all cases of formal rule-making or adjudication 10 5 is based on three considerations: "the established pattern
of court actions"; delays that occur after the hearing while a tentative
or recommended decision is formulated by someone other than the
presiding officer; and the superior qualifications of the presiding officer, as the Task Force views the matter, for carrying out the responsibility for decision. 1°6 The first reason involves broad considerations
rather than factors embraced specifically by this problem. The second reason is significant, although its precise importance cannot be
gauged. Delays have occurred in the process of staff preparation of
tentative or recommended decisions, and may well have exceeded
those that would have attended the preparation of reports by presiding
officers who already knew the records. Additional delays may, moreover, be avoided if hearing-officer reports are given effect as initial
decisions, subject to objections, because agency scrutiny is avoided
except when the need arises through a request for review. If, on the
other hand, the presiding officer's report is likely to be less satisfactory than a report prepared by someone else, the review process
may be more protracted than it would be if a more suitable document were prepared.
The Task Force reports from the data it has gathered that the
"initial decision is presently used in 11 statutory proceedings," and
that in nine others "the hearing examiner may prepare a recom102

60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(a) (1952).

103 Fuchs, The Model Act's Division of Administrative Proceedings into Rule-

Making and Contested Cases, 33 Iowa L. Rev. 210, 215-19 (1948).
304 Davis, Administrative Law 314-15 (1951).
The Labor Management Relations
Act, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952), and the 1952 amendments to the
Federal Communications Act, 66 Stat. 711, 47 U.S.C. § 409(b) (1952)
(with a
minor qualification), require that there be an initial decision by the hearing examiner
in all cases in which such an officer has presided at the hearing.
105 Task Force Recommendation No. 48; Code § 206(b), Task Force Rep. 372.
10 Task Force Rep. 202-03.
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mended decision." 107 No information is given as to whether these
proceedings are distinguishable in their characteristics from those in
which tentative or recommended decisions prepared by others are
employed, or whether delays or other undesirable consequences are
measurably greater in the latter than in the former. With so little
addition to previous bases for judgment, the Task Force recommendation remains of doubtful merit. Its sweeping nature gives rise to
persuasive objections to its adoption, and the matter should be allowed
to rest pending further study.
Insulation of Hearing Commissioners from Consultation with
Agency Personnel.-The recommendations of the Commission and
Task Force with reference to separation of functions within agencies
would insulate hearing commissioners more completely from advice
concerning the matters before them, except through on-the-record
testimony and consultation, than is the case even with trial judges.
This separation would prevent consultation with agency staff members
on any matters, and would extend to all formal rule-making and adjudication. Especially in conjunction with the proposals to require
initial decisions by hearing commissioners whenever they preside at
hearings and to give finality to their conclusions of fact unless clearly
erroneous, which have just been discussed, these recommendations involve fundamental change.
In addition to providing that hearing commissioners shall not be
subject to the supervision of agency personnel engaged in the performance of investigatory or prosecuting functions, the proposed code provision for the separation of functions, as it applies to hearing commissioners, prescribes that they shall not
consult any party on any issue of fact except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate, save to the extent required for the
disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law, ... be advised by
any other agency officer or employee except as a witness or counsel in
public proceedings of which all parties have notice and in which they
have full opportunity to participate, or ... permit any other agency
officer or employee to participate in any way in the formulation of findings or decisions ....

108

This provision would replace provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, applicable to formal adjudication with certain exceptions
but not to rule-making, which read:
Save to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law, [no presiding officer] ... shall consult any person or party on
any fact in issue unless upon notice and opportunity for all parties to par107 Id. at 202.

108 Code § 204(c), Task Force Rep. 409.
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No officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance

of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency in any case
shall, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the
decision, recommended decision, or agency review . . . except as witness or counsel in public proceedings. This subsection shall not apply in
determining applications for initial licenses or to proceedings involving
the validity or application of rates, facilities, or practices of public
utilities or carriers .... 109
By omitting the words "person or" from the prohibition against
consultation as to facts, the proposed code provision appears to be
narrower in one respect than the Administrative Procedure Act; but
the omission seems to have been inadvertent, since the Task Force's
comment on this provision reproduces its language as "any person or
party.""' It will be assumed in the subsequent discussion that these
words should be included.
The other changes of substance which the proposed code provision
would work are as follows: (1) the prohibition of consultation as to
facts would cover "any issue of fact" instead of "any fact in issue";
(2) the prohibition against rendering advice except as a witness or
counsel would extend to all agency personnel instead of being limited
to those who have engaged in investigative or prosecuting functions
in the same or a related case; and (3) the prohibitions would be applied to all formal agency adjudicative and rule-making proceedings
instead of being limited to adjudications not embraced by the exceptions stated in the present act.
The meaning of the second and third of these changes is clear;
that of the first depends on the meaning of "issue of fact" in the new
language as compared to "fact in issue" in the Administrative Procedure Act, when account is taken of the context of each phrase. The
legislative history of the act contains the statement that a single purpose accounts for the entire separation-of-functions provision. This
purpose is that
no investigating or prosecuting officer shall directly or indirectly in
any manner influence or control the operations of hearing and deciding
officers, except as a participant in public proceedings, and even then in
no different fashion than the private parties or their representatives."'
If, however, the purpose of both branches of the act's provision were
only as stated, the sentence prohibiting unannounced consultation as
to any fact in issue would be superfluous, since the second branch of
the provision covers this purpose. It would also be broader than
necessary because of its inclusion of "any person or party." The
109 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1952).
110 Task Force Rep. 409.
111 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 203, 262 (1946).
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sentence seems from its words to be designed to guard against improper off-the-record influences, from whatever source, relating to
facts in issue. The suggestion has been made that it does not restrict
consultation with agency personnel, because otherwise it would prevent desirable consultation with noninvestigating and nonprosecuting
officers, and would be inconsistent with the meaning given elsewhere
in the act to the word "person," where it does not include agency
personnel.1 2 Although this suggestion is tenable, it involves a departure from the natural meaning of the words used, and overlooks the fact that at two points in the same section the word
"parties" is used to include the agency. 113 It seems probable that
the act uses words such as these in different senses in different contexts. Nor is it necessary to omit agency personnel from the prohibition in order to preserve desirable intra-agency consultation; for
consultation regarding "any fact in issue" is not desirable in a proceeding where the decision is to rest upon the record of a hearing.
Consultation as to other matters is not forbidden by this provision.
Agency personnel, equally with outsiders, might supply evidence that
should come in via the record if the sentence in question did not apply
to them.
Construed as a whole, then, the Administrative Procedure Act's
limiting provisions " forbid the hearing officer in adjudications to
which these provisions apply to consult investigating or prosecuting
personnel of the agency for any purpose or to consult anyone else on
any "fact in issue." They leave the hearing officer free to consult
other persons, including noninvestigating and nonprosecuting agency
personnel, on matters that are not facts in issue, to the extent that
such consultation is consistent with the requirement that the final
determination be based on the record of the hearing.
According to a comment by the Attorney General, made before
the Administrative Procedure Act was reported upon by either judiciary committee or passed by either house of Congress, "the term 'fact
in issue' is used in its technical, litigious sense.""" It appears to mean,
therefore, a fact which is in dispute at a trial and becomes a subject
of evidence; and the term apparently does not embrace a fact which
is proposed for official notice. The phrase "any issue of fact," proposed by the Task Force, is more likely to include facts which may
be officially noticed, since such facts, although not "in issue" in a
technical sense, are subject to dispute. Therefore, the proposed code
112 Davis, Administrative Law 415-16 (1951).

1"3 "[Other parties" in § 2(a); "the parties" in § 2(b).
114 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1952).
115 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 410 (1946).
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provision, in addition to broadening the prohibition against advice
to presiding officers by agency personnel and extending its prohibitions
to all formal proceedings, appears to eliminate such consultation as
would otherwise be proper as part of the notice process.110 Whether
this is true or not, the aid of agency personnel in connection with
that process, as well as otherwise, would be withheld. They could not
even be consulted in advance of announcement by the hearing commissioner of proposed official notice in order to determine what might
be the information to be gained from them and subjected to refutation.
After an administrative hearing on the facts has ended, the decisional process includes, naturally and traditionally, use of the agency's
resources of knowlege and experience in formulating conclusions.
Agency knowledge embraces information stored in the minds of its
personnel and material in its files; its experience covers that which
the personnel of the agency, especially those with expert qualifications,
possess as individuals, together with that which has been built up in
the course of the agency's work. Together they form the basis of the
agency's capacity to judge soundly the matters entrusted to it.
Whether or not all agencies measure up to the standards of expertness and wisdom envisaged for them, the responsibility for judgment
within their areas of competence rests primarily on them and, within
those areas, is ordinarily more highly developed than the capacity of
courts in the same fields. It is important that this capacity be applied
in decisions at the same time procedural fairness to private parties is
secured.
The method whereby a hearing officer, entrusted with the function of preparing an initial or recommended decision on the basis of
the hearing before him, makes use of the agency's store of knowledge
and experience not already reflected in the record is through reference
to the agency's files and consultation with its personnel so far as
proper. The Administrative Procedure Act leaves these means of
116 The Administrative Procedure Act now provides that "where any agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the
record, any party shall on timely request be afforded an opportunity to show the contrary." § 7(d), 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(d) (1952). The code would provide, § 205(e), Task Force Rep. 371: "Where the decision by any agency includes
official notice of a material fact beyond the evidence appearing in the record, the decision
shall be without force or effect unless (1) the fact so noticed is specified in the record
or is brought to the attention of the parties before decision, and (2) every party
adversely affected by the decision is afforded an opportunity to controvert the fact so
noticed: Provided, that nothing in this subsection shall affect the application by an
agency in appropriate circumstances of the doctrine of judicial notice." Judicial notice
has been aptly characterized as a "process of informal proof and free investigation."
McCormick, Evidence 700 (1954). That process and its counterpart in administrative
proceedings, official notice, should include pre-eminently resort to sources of information
within agencies.
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drawing on the agency's resources open so far as consistent with the
record requirement, except for its prohibition, applicable to some
instances of adjudication, of consultation with agency personnel who
have engaged in investigating or prosecuting functions in the same or
a related proceeding." 7 The recommendations of the Commission and
Task Force as expressed in the proposed code would, as has been
seen, close the channels to other agency personnel by forbidding advice
by any agency officer or employee except as a witness or counsel in
public proceedings and by forbidding any such officer or employee to
participate in any way in the formulation of findings or decisions. To
the latter prohibition the code provision adds the qualification that
agency members, but not hearing commissioners, "may have the assistance of persons who are members of an independent review staff."118 The
hearing commissioner in all instances of formal adjudication and rulemaking, therefore, would be insulated from all nonpublic consultation
with agency personnel during his formulation of conclusions regarding a
case he had heard. He would be required to turn out a strictly personal product, unaided so far as agency personnel is concerned by the
recourse which even a trial judge may have to sources of information
appropriate for judicial notice and to advice on questions of law or
policy.
These restrictions on intra-agency consultation by hearing commissioners would be imposed for the purpose of preventing the
"prosecutor-judge" combination within agencies, as broadly conceived,
from having any effect upon hearing-commissioner decisions, 11 9 although, as has been seen, 0 the combination referred to is of varying
nature and significance in proceedings where it prevails. "Institutional
decisions," involving consultation and advice among agency personnel,
which heretofore have been a principal source of strength in administrative proceedings,"2 would become a thing of the past in formal
proceedings, and the decision in any such proceeding in which a hearing commissioner had presided would take shape in a document prepared by him in isolation, with his conclusions of fact given final effect
unless clearly erroneous.
It is true that the hearing commissioner could reopen the hearing
in order to receive testimony or advice concerning matters of which
he wished to take official notice or upon which he desired to hear argument. Although this process is appropriate from time to time, its
117 See text at note 109 supra.

118 Code § 204(c), Task Force Rep. 368.
119 Conm'n Rep. 61; Task Force Rep. 176-77.
120 See note 91 supra.
321 Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Problem-Symptom and Symbol, 40 Cornell L.Q.
281, 289-91 (19S5).
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cumbersomeness is apparent, and the Commission and Task Force
reports do not supply a justification for requiring it each time a hearing commissioner needs to talk to someone within the agency he is
serving, except by reference to danger residing in the combination of
functions. The reopening of hearings would increase delays in administrative proceedings, to which the reports object, 122 and the probability is that hearing commissioners would heroically perform their
tasks in solitude rather than impose these delays. The public would
be denied a large part of the benefits which Congress had endeavored
to secure by creating agencies equipped to render informed decisions,
especially in rule-making, licensing, and other proceedings in which
facts relating to the future are involved.
If consultation by hearing commissioners with agency personnel
is permitted at all, there is, it is true, a need for maintaining a distinction between, on the one hand, those communications that are
improper because they relate to facts in issue or to matters of official
notice which the parties to a proceeding should have an opportunity to
controvert and, on the other hand, matters involving the agency's
background knowledge or bases for judgment, as to which consultation
is proper. Judges are trusted to maintain such distinctions even
though, apart from a developed sense of ethics, they and members of
the bar with whom they may have close personal relations could easily
circumvent the restrictions. Agency personnel are, in general, similarly trusted. To carry statutory prohibitions in connection with
administrative proceedings to the length now proposed would be an
expression of distrust of officials which could hardly be conducive
to good governmental performance.
X
CONCLUSION

In sum, then, the Hoover Commission and Task Force recommendations on legal services and procedure as they affect hearing
commissioners vary in desirability from certain ones which the present
writer believes to be sound to others that appear seriously harmful.
Between the two extremes are some that seem to call for further evidence of their desirability.
The salaries and tenure proposed for members of the hearingcommissioner corps would provide excellently for personnel of high
grade and for an appropriate relationship of their status to that of
other government officials. A corps of hearing commissioners outside
122

Comm'n Recommendation No. 38; Task Force Recommendation No. 42; Code

§ 204(d), Task Force Rep. 369.
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of the agencies, administered by a chief hearing commissioner who
would assign its members to the agencies on a continuing basis, has
much to be said for it; but improvement in the present system of
agency appointment would be preferable if agency authority in regard
to hearing and decision were not curtailed to the extent proposed in
the reports. A separately administered personnel system for the selection of hearing commissioners, such as is recommended, would be desirable; but the experience of the Civil Service Commission should be
drawn upon inadministering it, and there should be statutory provision
to assure observance of merit-system principles.
In the functioning of hearing commissioners, enlarged powers of
commissioners at hearings accompanied by severe restriction of interlocutory appeals, such as are recommended, would be highly desirable;
but the Commission's recommendation to retain agency authority to
allow such appeals upon a showing of substantial prejudice from their
absence seems preferable to the Task Force's proposal to place the
entire authority with respect to interlocutory appeals in the hearing
commissioners. It would be extremely damaging to administrative
processes and to the discharge of agency responsibilities, especially in
rule-making and other "forward-looking" proceedings such as licensing, if the power to find facts, subject to only limited review by
the agencies, were vested in hearing commissioners as proposed by the
Task Force but not by the Commission. Equally damaging would be
such complete insulation from agency personnel in the preparation of
initial decisions by hearing commissioners as the proposed administrative code would establish. Although a requirement that hearing commissioners prepare such decisions in all cases where they have presided
might not be harmful, the case for such a requirement has not been
made out.
In general, it seems fair to say that the Task Force recommendations and, to a less extent, those transmitted by the Commission and
endorsed by three of its members are an extreme application of the
Task Force's expressed devotion to judicial methods-an application,
in fact, which proposes to out-judicialize the courts. So to restrict
administrative processes and risk defeat of the purposes for which
administrative agencies are established would unjustifiably thwart
legislative ends.
These are times in which government is distrusted as it has not
been since the boom period of the 1920's. It is therefore easy for
lawyers, whose judicial ideal is already woven into the culture, to
make an impression with appeals for manifest justice according to the
methods of their craft, at the expense of effective administration. Such
appeals have validity and were never more needed than now. Despite
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the disfavor into which government has fallen, it has acquired greater
power than ever over essential human rights as security investigations, expulsion of aliens, and restrictions on international travel have
been carried forward. It would be a dangerous fallacy for lawyers to
conclude, however, that the answers to all procedural problems reside exclusively in their tradition, and that present and future governmental needs can be met without allowing scope for the methods which
administrative officials have found to be adapted to their functions.' "
The more extreme recommendations of the Task Force and, to a less
degree, those transmitted by the Commission seem chargeable with
origination in just this fallacy.
123 Cf. Grundstein, Law and the Morality of Administration, 21 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 265 (1953).
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